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A.1 Competition and Customer Pressure for Leniency 
 
We earlier argued that, under fixed prices, firms compete by providing illicit quality to customers through 
test  manipulation.  By  providing  customers  with  more  alternatives,  competition  pressures  firms  to  take 
additional steps to retain or capture customers. In emissions testing, this suggests that increased competition 
provides  customers  with  additional  suppliers  should  they  be  dissatisfied  with  a  failed  test  result.  To 
empirically test for the presence of this incentive for leniency, we use a forward-looking sample of emissions 
tests that includes only those vehicles for which we can observe a test the following year. This sample excludes 
all emissions tests in the last year of our sample (since we cannot observe the subsequent test) and excludes 
vehicles that were sold out of state or scrapped following the final test.  
 
Using this sample, we estimate a linear probability model with the individual test as the unit of analysis. 
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a vehicle returns next year to the same inspection 
facility. The results indicate that passing the emissions test clearly increases the likelihood that a customer will 
return to the facility the next year (Table A-1, Column 1). Adding the number of proximate facilities to the 
model yields a statistically significant negative coefficient, which indicates that testing facilities face greater 
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difficulty retaining customers who have more suppliers from which to choose (Column 2). These two results 
are robust to the inclusion of controls for the tested vehicle’s vintage and usage and to the inclusion of fixed 
effects for inspection year, neighborhood, and make/model (Column 3).  
 
In Figure A-1, we plot the predicted probability of return at various levels of competition, based on a 
model  that  regresses  returns  next  year  on  number  of  proximate  facilities  and  on  that  value  squared.  The 
probability of return consistently decreases out to 10 competitors, suggesting that competition continues to 
impact firms far beyond the first, second, or third proximate firm. As mentioned earlier, Column 4 of Table 
A-1 presents the model with luxury vehicle interacted with number of proximate facilities. The results indicate 
that owners of luxury vehicles are less prone than owners of other vehicles to abandon their facility in local 
markets with greater competition. 
A.2 Competition and the Distribution of Conditional Facility-Level Leniency  
 
Because the pass rates in Figure 6 do not control for differences in facilities’ neighborhood characteristics or 
vehicle  portfolios,  we  estimated  conditional  pass  rates  as  follows.  We  estimated  a  regression  identical  to 
Column 2 of Table 2, generated predicted pass rates for each test, and calculated facility averages from these 
predicted values. The difference between the observed facility pass rates and these predicted facility averages 
became our facility-level conditional pass rates. Figure A-2 depicts the distributions of these conditional pass 
rates for the subsamples of (a) facilities with no local competitors and (b) facilities with at least one local 
competitor.  These  distributions  are  very  similar  to  the  unconditional  distributions  depicted  in  Figure  6. 
Facilities facing no local competitors are approximately 1.6 percentage points more likely to fall in the bottom 
10  percent  of  the  distribution  than  their  counterparts  that  face  local  competition  (t  stat=2.89;  p<0.01). 
Facilities that face no local competition are also 0.6 percentage points less likely to fall in the top 10 percent 
of the distribution, although this difference is not statistically significant. To ensure that these differences are 
not artifacts of data structure, we run 10,000 simulations, in which we randomly assign each of the 11,197 
firms to a competitive or noncompetitive designation, then test the difference in the frequency with which a 
firm in each group is in the bottom 10 percent of the pass-rate distribution. Out of 10,000 simulations, only 
eight produce a t-statistic exceeding the value of 3.27 observed in our data. 
 
2(1) (2) (3) (4)
Passed inspection
12.580***
(.127)
12.610***
(.126)
10.677***
(.113)
10.68***
(.113)
Number of proximate facilities
-1.070***
(.086)
-.677***
(.088)
-.729***
(.089)
Luxury vehicle Absorbed
Number of proximate facilities X Luxury vehicle
.480***
(.167)
Odometer level, squared, and cubed Included Included Included
3-digit ZIP code fixed effects Included Included Included
Year fixed effects Included Included
Model year and model year squared Included Included
Make X model fixed effects Included Included
Sample All facilities All facilities All facilities All facilities
Observations 21,411,677 21,411,677 21,411,677 21,411,677
Note:  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels, respectively. Results reported 
are OLS coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at 
the facility level.
Appendix Table A-1: Impact of competition on return probability
Dependent variable: Returns next year
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Figure A-2: Distribution of conditional pass rates, by market structure
Note: There are 11,194 total observations. Kernel density estimation used. No proximate facilities
means that the facility never faced a neighboring test center during the sample period. Number of proximate 
facilities calculated using a 0.2-mile ring around the focal facility.
Bottom 10% of the 
overall distribution
Middle 80% of the 
overall distribution
Top 10% of the 
overall distribution
No proximate 
facilities (solid)
1+ proximate 
facilities (dash)
No proximate facilities: 10.8%
1+ proximate facilities: 9.2%
T-stat of difference: 2.89
No proximate facilities: 79.5%
1+ proximate facilities: 80.5%
T-stat of difference: -1.21
No proximate facilities: 9.7%
1+ proximate facilities: 10.3%
T-stat of difference: -1.27
Appendix Figure A-1: Predicted return rate by competition level
Mean return rate 
from raw data
95% confidence interval
Regression predicted return rate
Note: Note: Predicted pass rates and confidence intervals are derived from regressing returns next year on
number of proximate facilities and on that value squared. Number of proximate facilities calculated using 
a 0.2-mile ring around the focal facility.
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